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Daniel Del Gobbo*

Lighting a Spark, Playing with Fire:
Feminism, Emotions, and the Legal
Imagination of Campus Sexual Violence

Feminist law and policymakers have been inspired by collectively generated
experiences of emotion that help to shape what counts as justice and injustice in
campus sexual violence cases. Focusing on events surrounding the Dalhousie
University Faculty of Dentistry in 2014–2015, this article explains how emotional
incitements in the case contributed to an infrastructure that supported formal
and specifically carceral responses to campus sexual violence. Correspondingly,
this article explains why alternative modes of legal and political formation that
challenged the premises of the formal law, including restorative justice, were
misread by some commentators as a form of “weak justice” and therefore outside
the bounds of feminist action. The central claim of the article is not that particular
emotional reactions are right or wrong, but that feminist law and policymakers
should reflect on and assess their political force. Considering the ways that
emotions are mobilized reveals the benefits and drawbacks of engaging with law in
ways that feel emotionally gratifying and therefore politically necessary, but which
can lead to harmful consequences that contradict feminist goals.

Les législateurs et les décideurs politiques féministes ont été collectivement
inspirés par les expériences émotives qui contribuent à façonner ce qui compte
comme justice et injustice dans les cas de violence sexuelle sur les campus
universitaires. En se concentrant sur les événements entourant la faculté de
médecine dentaire de l’Université Dalhousie en 2014–2015, nous expliquons dans
cet article comment les incitations émotionnelles dans l’affaire ont contribué à une
infrastructure qui a soutenu des réponses formelles et spécifiquement carcérales
à la violence sexuelle sur le campus. Corrélativement, nous expliquons pourquoi
les modes alternatifs de formation juridique et politique qui remettent en cause les
prémisses du droit formel, y compris la justice réparatrice, ont été interprétés à
tort par certains commentateurs comme une forme de « justice faible » et donc en
dehors des limites de l’action féministe. L’affirmation au cœur de notre article n’est
pas que des réactions émotionnelles particulières sont bonnes ou mauvaises,
mais que les législateurs et les décideurs politiques féministes devraient réfléchir
à leur force politique et l’évaluer. L’examen des façons dont les émotions sont
mobilisées révèle les avantages et les inconvénients de s’engager dans le droit
d’une manière qui semble émotionnellement gratifiante et donc politiquement
nécessaire, mais qui peut conduire à des conséquences néfastes qui contredisent
les objectifs féministes.
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Introduction
Campus sexual violence reform is conducted in an emotional minefield. In
December 2014, a fourth-year male student in the Faculty of Dentistry at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia posted a question about his
female classmates in an all-male, private Facebook group called the “Class
of DDS [Dalhousie Dentistry Students] 2015 Gentlemen.”1 The question
took the form of an online poll asking “Who would you hate fuck?” and
provided names to vote on.2 Several members of the Facebook group voted
in the poll before one member showed the post to a female classmate, who
subsequently reported the group’s existence to the university with a view
to stopping it.3 Shortly thereafter, screenshots of the “hate fuck” poll and
other offensive posts were leaked to CBC News where the story exploded
in the Canadian media and the full scope of the male students’ conduct
came to light.4
Several posts in the Facebook group had an overtly sexist, misogynistic,
or homophobic character. One member suggested that the word “penis”
be redefined as “the tool used to wean and convert lesbians and virgins
into productive members of society.”5 Another member commented in

1.
See Constance Backhouse, Donald McRae & Nitya Iyer, “Report of the Task Force on
Misogyny, Sexism, and Homophobia in Dalhousie University Faculty of Dentistry” (26 June 2015)
at 7, online (pdf): Dalhousie University <cdn.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/cultureofrespect/
DalhousieDentistry-TaskForceReport-June2015.pdf> [perma.cc/F8L9-EZF7] [Backhouse Report].
2.
Ibid at 7.
3.
Ibid at 7, 9.
4.
Ibid at 11.
5.
Ibid at 7.
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response: “and by productive I’m assuming you mean it inspires them
to become chefs, housekeepers, babysitters, etc.”6 Elsewhere, members
of the group referred to one of their female professors as a “crazy bitch,”
one of their male professors as looking “like a pornstar,” and another male
professor as “under more heat for sexual harassment than anyone since
[a previous professor] and gives a final with 69 questions. What a boss.”7
Another post included photographs of larger women wearing bathing suits,
implying that the women should be ridiculed because of their size.8 Most
troublingly, several of the men talked about committing sexual assault.
One member posted a photograph of a woman wearing a bikini and wrote
the caption “Bang until stress is relieved or unconscious (girl).”9 Other
members commented on the photo, asking “Can you tell me what this
chloroform smells like?” and “Does this mask smell like nitrous oxide
to you?”10 Similarly, the posts included another photograph of a woman,
reported to be a female student in the class, with the superimposed words,
“Does this rag smell like chloroform to you?”11
Most of the female students chose to proceed with their complaints
through restorative justice instead of a more formal investigation process on
campus.12 The restorative justice facilitators conducted over 40 interviews
and held individual and group sessions on such topics as misogyny and
homophobia, bystander intervention, human rights, and the intersections
of race, culture, gender, and other factors.13 Critical reflective practice
was made a priority throughout, as the participants considered efforts to
apply these learnings in social, educational, and clinical settings.14 Each
of the male students spent approximately 150 hours in restorative justice.15
The process culminated in a Day of Learning event in April 2015, which
provided an opportunity for the participants to share their collective
learning and recommendations for the future.16 Afterward, the restorative
6.
Ibid.
7.
Ibid at 8.
8.
Ibid at 7.
9.
Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. See “Dalhousie University probes misogynistic student ‘Gentlemen’s Club’” CBC News
(15 December 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/dalhousie-university-probesmisogynistic-student-gentlemen-s-club-1.2873918> [perma.cc/H2ZR-6K3G].
12. See Jennifer J Llewellyn, Jacob MacIsaac & Melissa MacKay, “Report from the Restorative
Justice Process at the Dalhousie University Faculty of Dentistry” (May 2015) at 20-21, online (pdf):
Dalhousie University <www.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/cultureofrespect/RJ2015-Report.pdf >
[perma.cc/ZG3U-ZJS5] [Llewellyn Report].
13. Ibid at 36-37.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid at 36.
16. Ibid at 29-30.
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justice facilitators prepared individual assessments for the male students
who participated in the process.17 All of the men were found to have
successfully remediated and met the required standard of professionalism
in order to graduate.18
The restorative justice process was conducted under threat of being
terminated.19 Feminist student activists rallied at the university to heighten
public awareness and condemn the male students’ conduct, holding signs
that read such things as “Expel Misogyny,” “We Want Names,” “Expel
Rape Culture,” “Inspiring Minds, Enabling Rapists,” and “No One Who
Thinks Rape is Funny Should Ever Be Allowed Access to Sedatives.”20
An online petition that the university should punish the male students
garnered over 50,000 signatures.21 Op-eds and think pieces were
published nationwide that weighed the relative merits and drawbacks of
the university’s response.22 The Twitter hashtags #DalhousieHatesWomen
and #DalHatesWomen garnered over 60,000 tweets.23 The international
hacktivist group Anonymous threatened to expose the male students’
names as well as the names of university employees who failed to act
on the complaints.24 The Halifax Regional Police became involved in
response to requests for a criminal investigation, pleading for the female
students to come forward and make formal reports.25
The Facebook group and restorative justice process in the Dalhousie
Dentistry case are examples of what Sarah Banet-Weiser calls “feminist
flashpoints,” or emotional incendiary devices that both open up and
constrain our thinking about law, gender, and equality.26 Riffing on BanetWeiser’s concept, my central claim in this article is that collectively
generated experiences of emotion help to shape what counts as justice and
17. Ibid at 30.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid at 27.
20. Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 11.
21. See Meghan B, “Expel Students Who Were Members and/or Participated in the Facebook
Group Called ‘Class of DDS 2015 Gentlemen’” Change.org, online: <www.change.org/p/dalhousieuniversity-president-dr-richard-florizone-expel-the-students-who-were-members-and-or-participatedin-the-facebook-group-called-class-of-dds-2015-gentlemen> [perma.cc/D56L-ZS3S].
22. Media coverage of the case was extensive, totalling approximately 3,500 local and national
news stories. See Jennifer J Llewellyn, “Responding Restoratively to Student Misconduct and
Professional Regulation: The Case of Dalhousie Dentistry” in Gale Burford, John Braithwaite &
Valerie Braithwaite, eds, Restorative and Responsive Human Services (New York: Routledge, 2019)
at 133.
23. See Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 11.
24. Ibid at 12.
25. Ibid.
26. Sarah Banet-Weiser, “Popular Feminism: Feminist Flashpoints” LA Review of Books (5 October
2018), online: <lareviewofbooks.org/article/popular-feminism-feminist-flashpoints/#!> [perma.cc/
X9N7-JUEX].
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injustice in campus sexual violence cases. Emotions provide one of the
rhetorical and epistemological bases on which the crisis of access to justice
for complainants has been observed. However, the role of emotions in
this context is fraught. Considering the ways that emotions are mobilized
reveals the benefits and drawbacks of engaging with the legal system in
ways that feel emotionally gratifying and therefore legally and politically
necessary to address campus sexual violence, but which lead to harmful
consequences that contradict the mission of substantive equality. Feeling
justice and doing justice are not necessarily the same thing.
I elaborate my argument as follows. In Part I, I canvas the relationship
between law, emotions, and justice in light of the privileging of reason
over emotion in liberal legal theory. Contemporary psychological and
philosophical accounts teach us that emotions are essential to the proper
functioning of rationality and therefore lead to moral actions. As such,
emotions are implicated in the legal interpretation and decision-making
abilities in which law and policymakers routinely engage. After laying
this groundwork, I explain that the privileging of reason over emotion is
both raced and gendered. Emotions have been trivialized, repressed, and
excluded from the law as a means of policing cultural norms about the
“respectable” expression of men and women’s emotions, and racialized
women’s emotions especially. Critical analysis of law and the emotions
requires a recognition of the fact that our society is constituted by what
Arlie Hochschild calls “feeling rules”—rules about what feeling is or is
not rightly owed in a given social setting—which impress upon women
and other historically marginalized groups differently.27
In Part II, I reflect on my emotional reactions to the Dalhousie
Dentistry case as a feminist student activist in the 2014–2015 year—what
I remember thinking and feeling about the events at the time. Cognizant
of the limits of my social location in the feminist movement, I can attest
that emotions play an important role in raising the public’s awareness,
building solidarity among complainants and allies, and inspiring feminist
law and policymakers to take moral action on campus sexual violence.
After establishing this, I consider the links between emotions and
carcerality as one possible form of moral action in this context. Returning
to the Dalhousie Dentistry case, I explain that emotions can be leveraged
in support of formal, adversarial, and carceral state responses to campus
sexual violence by rationalizing them as legitimate. Correspondingly,
I explain that emotions can be leveraged against legal theories and
27. Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, 20th
century ed (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003) at 18.
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methodologies that challenge the carceral state, including restorative
justice, by rationalizing them as a form of “weak justice” and insufficiently
“tough on crime.”
In Part III, I provide my key takeaways from this analysis, one of
which is important to establish at the outset because it informs the
political values that I try to foreground throughout. One of the central
preoccupations of law-and-emotions scholarship has been whether the
legal system should privilege the experience of certain emotions over
others.28 Much of this work is innovative and worth exploring elsewhere,
but I am not endorsing a hierarchy of emotions per se in this article.
Given the exclusionary practices that I mentioned above, it is patronizing,
oppressive, and silencing to tell anyone to feel less or feel differently about
the immorality of campus sexual violence. Rather, I am making the more
nuanced claim in this article that feminist law and policymakers should
critically reflect on the force of our emotions from a substantive equality
perspective and conduct ourselves accordingly. As Alison Jaggar puts
it, “[c]ritical reflection on emotion is not a self-indulgent substitute for
political analysis and political action. It is itself a kind of political theory
and political practice, indispensable for an adequate social theory and
social transformation.”29
I. Law, emotions, and affective justice
Legal reasoning is shot through with emotional influence. Far from being
a trite claim, the law-and-emotions field is premised on challenging the
historical opposition of reason and emotion in liberal legal theory.30
Conventional wisdom holds that emotions are counterproductive to the
“rational” and “objective” process of legal interpretation and decisionmaking.31 Terry Maroney explains that “[a] core presumption underlying
28. See Kathryn Abrams, “Seeking Emotional Ends with Legal Means” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 1657
at 1667-1668. For examples of this kind of approach, see Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and
Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1998) at
52-90; Kathryn Abrams & Hila Karen, “Law in the Cultivation of Hope” (2007) 95:2 Cal L Rev 319;
Maksymilian Del Mar, “Imagining by Feeling: A Case for Compassion in Legal Reasoning” (2017)
13:2 Intl JL in Context 143.
29. Alison M Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” (1989) 32:2
Inquiry 151 at 171.
30. The proposition that emotion is antithetical to legal knowledge has ancient origins. See Jaggar,
ibid at 151. Further support for the proposition may be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, David
Hume, and Immanuel Kant. See Terry Maroney, “Judges and their Emotions” (2013) 64:1 N Ir Leg
Q 11 at 12; Carlton J Patrick, “A New Synthesis for Law and Emotions: Insights from the Behavioral
Sciences” (2015) 47:4 Ariz St LJ 1239 at 1266; Robert C Solomon, “Justice v. Vengeance: On Law
and the Satisfaction of Emotion” in Susan A Bandes, ed, The Passions of Law (New York: New York
University Press, 1999) at 128.
31. For a classic statement of the risks of introducing passion into the legal reasoning process, see
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modern legality is that reason and emotion are different beasts entirely:
they belong to separate spheres of human existence; the sphere of law
admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion
from creeping in where it does not belong.”32 On the traditional view,
emotions are conceived as individual bursts of positive or negative
feeling—happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, etc.—which
are accompanied by an instinctive, often irrational response to a given
stimulus.33 Given their subjective and uncontrolled nature, emotions
are said to run contrary to the cool-headed, intellectual, and objectivist
methodology of law that is supposed to be free from such influence.
Maroney’s invocation of “separate spheres” ideology in the above
quote is likely intentional because the privileging of reason over emotion
is explicitly gendered. Reason and emotion have been socially scripted as
the “natural” and “necessary” provinces of men and women respectively,
which has implications for the way that gender is constituted by the
elevation of so-called “male” traits over “female” traits in law and life.34
Emotions have been trivialized, repressed, and excluded from law as a
means of policing the gender binary and relegating women to the private
sphere. The law functions, therefore, as a tool of affective governance,
regulating and disciplining men and women through the classification
of their emotional responses as “properly” befitting their gender and
sexuality. This is a transhistorical phenomenon. Legal and professional
discourses contribute to a climate in which gender expectations about
the “socially acceptable” expression of emotions continue to proliferate
today. Recognizing that emotions have rational structures is a prelude
to understanding that gender performances are fluid and the hierarchical
organization of male traits over female traits—reason over emotion—is a
social construction that finds no basis in fact.
The figure of the rational, emotionally detached lawyer is a myth.
Emotions are not merely bursts of individual feeling, but complex social
Owen M Fiss, “Reason in All Its Splendor” (1990) 56:3 Brook L Rev 789.
32. Terry A Maroney, “Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field” (2006) 30:2
L Human Behavior 119 at 120.
33. See Hila Keren, “Valuing Emotions” (2018) 53:5 Wake Forest L Rev 829 at 854; Emily Kidd
White, “Till Human Voices Wake Us” (2014) 3:3 JL Religion & State 201 at 205, n 13; Del Mar, supra
note 28 at 146.
34. See Jaggar, supra note 29 at 151, 164; Robin West, “Love, Rage and Legal Theory” (1989) 1:1
Yale JL & Feminism 101 at 101, 109; Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York:
Routledge, 2004) at 170 [Ahmed, Cultural Politics]; Kathryn Abrams, “Legal Feminism and the
Emotions: Three Moments in an Evolving Relationship” (2005) 28:2 Harv JL & Gender 325 at 327;
Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, “Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?” (2010) 94:6 Minn L Rev
1997 at 2029, 2031. For a critique of separate spheres ideology in the ADR context, see Daniel Del
Gobbo, “The Feminist Negotiator’s Dilemma” (2018) 33:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 1 at 35-36.
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processes with internal and external elements that lend themselves to
legal reasoning.35 There is a pro-emotion consensus among contemporary
psychologists, philosophers, and affective scientists that emotions are
necessary to the proper functioning of theoretical and practical rationality
and therefore lead to responsive action.36 The first part of this claim is
that emotions reveal reasons.37 Emotions reveal something about what a
person is observing, thinking, and reasoning about their environment—
what is known in the psychology field as a “cognitive appraisal.”38 The
second part of this claim is that emotions motivate action in the service of
reasons.39 The progression from emotions to action is highly contingent,
but research shows that emotions can focus a person’s attention on the
environment, prompt them to evaluate or “appraise” its relevance or quality
in their lives, and then enable them to respond in a manner that furthers
their rational objectives.40 As such, emotions are implicated in cognitive
ability and the rational, evaluative assessments in which lawyers, judges,
and other legal actors engage.41
Consider the emotion of anger to illustrate these concepts. The
conventional view is that anger and its related state, vengeance, are
socially disruptive, uncontrolled, and by its nature opposed to law and
their rational constraints.42 The popular concepts of the “blind fury,”
35. See Keren, supra note 33 at 854; Kidd White, supra note 33 at 205, n 13; Emily Kidd White, “On
Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning” in Amalia Amaya & Maksymilian Del
Mar, eds, Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning (London: Hart Publishing,
2020) at 114.
36. See Christine Tappolet, “Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear” in Peter Goldie,
ed, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 326,
citing Karen Jones, “Quick and Smart? Modularity and the Pro-Emotion Consensus” in Luc Faucher
& Christine Tappolet, eds, The Modularity of Emotions (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2008).
The literature on the relationship between emotion and rationality is immense. For classic works, see
Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Robert C Solomon,
The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, 2nd ed (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993); Anthony
Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Gossett/Putnam,
1994); Robert C Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003); John Deigh, Emotions, Values, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Martha C Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, 8th ed (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Michael S Brady, Epistemic Insight: The Epistemic Role of
Emotional Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
37. See Maroney, supra note 30 at 14.
38. Ibid. See also Jaggar, supra note 29 at 159; Keren, supra note 33 at 855.
39. See Maroney, supra note 30 at 14.
40. Ibid. For more on the role of emotion in focusing attention, see Keren, supra note 33 at 854;
Brady, supra note 36.
41. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 34 at 2004. For a compelling illustration, see Dawn Moore &
Rashmee Singh, “Seeing Crime, Feeling Crime: Visual Evidence, Emotions, and the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence” (2018) 22:1 Theoretical Criminology 116 at 122.
42. Solomon, supra note 30 at 129. For more on the notion that anger is counterproductive to legal
reasoning, see Terry A Maroney, “Angry Judges” (2012) 65:5 Vand L Rev 1205 at 1209, 1219-1220;
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“angry mob,” and being “mad with rage” help to create this mistaken
impression.43 In fact, feelings of anger reveal that a cognitive appraisal
of the object of the emotion has taken place—typically, a judgment that
a person or group has been wronged or suffered damage in some way.44
The emotion is frequently linked to themes of frustration, goal blockage,
feeling betrayed, insults, and unfair treatment.45 Accordingly, the emotion
is based on a principled or consequentialist assessment of the material
conditions in which a person or group find themselves, in the person’s
mind, without rational justification. Martha Nussbaum outlines the
operation: “In order to have anger, I must have [a] complex set of beliefs:
that some damage has occurred to me or to something or someone close
to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by
someone; probably, that it was done willingly.”46
In the psychology field, emotions are said to have a “moral” character
when they are inspired by the interests or welfare of other people or
society as a whole.47 Correspondingly, Roger Giner-Sorolla explains that
moral anger is a type of anger that emerges from perceived injustice,
responding to “rules of blame and fairness, taking into account the
legitimacy of claims, intentionality of action, whether or not someone
is harmed, and generally working with the concept of rights.”48 Feeling
angry is a means of recognizing a moral violation, regardless of whether
the emotion is productive in the strategic or prudential sense.49 As such,
moral anger has implications for legal reasoning because it is based on
Janine Young Kim, “Racial Emotions and the Feeling of Equality” (2016) 87:2 U Colo L Rev 437
at 459; Amia Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger” (2017) 26:2 J Political Philosophy 123 at 125127; Keelah EG Williams & Art Hinshaw, “Outbursts: An Evolutionary Approach to Emotions in the
Mediation Context” (2018) 34:2 Negotiation J 165 at 171-172.
43. See Gary Peller, “Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation” (1987) 2:3 Tikkun 28 at
31.
44. See Keren, supra note 33 at 855-856; Maroney, supra note 42 at 1209, 1218-1219, 1262;
Williams & Hinshaw, supra note 42 at 173-174.
45. See Jonathan Haidt, “The Moral Emotions” in Richard J Davidson, Klaus R Scherer & H Hill
Goldsmith, eds, Handbook of Affective Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 856;
Williams & Hinshaw, supra note 42 at 172.
46. Nussbaum, supra note 36 at 28-29.
47. See Haidt, supra note 45 at 853. For psychological research on the moral emotions, see Jesse
Prinz, “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments” (2006) 9:1 Philosophical Explorations 29; June
Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig & Debra J Mashek, “Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior” (2007) 58:1
Annual Rev Psychology 345; Roger Giner-Sorolla, Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and
Groups (London: Psychology Press, 2012); Melanie Killen & Judith G Smetana, eds, Handbook of
Moral Development, 2nd ed (London: Psychology Press, 2014).
48. Giner-Sorolla, ibid at 93. See also Maroney, supra note 42 at 1262; Sarah Buhler, “Troubling
Feelings: Moral Anger and Clinical Legal Education” (2014) 37:1 Dalhousie LJ 397 at 399-400.
49. See Srinivasan, supra note 42 at 128-129. For complementary takes on this recognition
function, see Jaggar, supra note 29 at 167; Martha C Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment,
Generosity, Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 211.
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principles of fairness, equality, and other justice norms that are central
to legal interpretation and decision-making. Robert Solomon concludes:
“[T]o pack all of the reasonable solutions and their mode of deliberation
into one set of categories (‘reason, justice’) and only the most unreasonable,
vindictive, and ill-considered emotional responses into another (‘emotion,
vengeance’) is to render reason insensitive and emotions devoid of sense.”50
Anger is an overtly political emotion as well as a legal one, capable
of inspiring social progress and change in the service of justice norms.
Audre Lorde suggests that anger must first be expressed—and ideally,
permitted and encouraged by law to be expressed—in order for it to be
most effective.51 As Lorde puts it, “anger has eaten clefts into my living
only when it remained unspoken, useless to anyone.”52 Expressing anger
can have therapeutic benefits to the person feeling it, particularly when the
expression helps to identify and call out something like racism, sexism, or
homophobia that was previously left unaddressed.53 Anger is a powerful
social motivator on both the individual and collective levels, capable of
improving perception, focusing attention, and spurring persistence toward
political goals if progress toward them is not forthcoming.54 Indeed,
it might be said that feeling angry is a precondition to membership in
feminism and most other, if not all identity-based social movements that
fight for change.55

50. Solomon, supra note 30 at 129.
51. Audre Lorde, “The Uses of Anger” (1981) 9:3 Women’s Studies Q 7 at 9.
52. Ibid. See also Thomas R West, Signs of Struggle: The Rhetorical Politics of Cultural Difference
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002) at 80.
53. See Maroney, supra note 42 at 1262-1263: Anger is considered to be communicative and “otherdirected” in nature, unlike the more self-protective emotions of contempt and disgust, because it is
frequently intended to bring people together, inspire feelings of guilt, reparation, or appeasement,
and ultimately lead to a change in someone else’s ways. See also Giner-Sorolla, supra note 47 at 98;
Williams & Hinshaw, supra note 42 at 174. For a taxonomy of the “other-directed” emotions, see Del
Mar, supra note 28 at 145-146.
54. Research on the role of anger in motivation is extensive. See Maroney, supra note 42 at 1263;
Kim, supra note 42 at 483; Srinivasan, supra note 42 at 126; Buhler, supra note 48 at 399-400, 413;
Giner-Sorolla, supra note 47 at 97.
55. See Kim, supra note 42 at 491, citing Arlie Hochschild, “The Sociology of Feeling and Emotion:
Selected Possibilities” in Marcia Millman & Rosabeth Moss Kanter, eds, Another Voice: Feminist
Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science (New York: Doubleday, 1975) at 298; West, supra note
34 at 102-103. For more on the role of anger in social movements, see Francesca Polletta, “The Laws
of Passion” (2001) 35:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 467 at 483-484; Mary Holmes, “Feeling Beyond Rules:
Politicizing the Sociology of Emotion and Anger in Feminist Politics” (2004) 7:2 European J Soc
Theory 209; Simon Thompson, “Anger and the Struggle for Justice” in Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett
& Simon Thompson, eds, Emotion, Politics and Society (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 123;
James M Jasper, “Constructing Indignation: Anger Dynamics in Protest Movements” (2014) 6:3
Emotion Rev 208; Maxime Lepoutre, “Rage Inside the Machine: Defending the Place of Anger in
Democratic Speech” (2018) 17:4 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 398.
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One might theorize the moral emotions through the lens of what Kamari
Clarke calls “affective justice.”56 According to Clarke, “affective justice
reflects the way that people come to understand, challenge, and influence
legal orders through the biopolitical instrumentalization of technocratic
knowledge as well as through their affective embodiments, interjections,
and social actions.”57 Emotions constitute a bridge between precognitive
sensory impressions in the body and the production of legal institutions by
that body: “As the individual feels and expresses, social practices shape
what ultimately counts as justice.”58 Law is often presumed to fall outside
the realm of such practices, relying on legal precedents that exist freely
and independently from social construction. Clarke explains that this is
a fallacy because law’s meaning is implicated in the ways that “bodies,
psychology, and social practices come together to produce the terms on
which justice is materialized, disaggregated, ruptured, and made legible
again.”59
Correspondingly, Amia Srinivasan calls attention to cases of “affective
injustice” in which legal actors are forced to moderate their emotions,
including anger, so as to appear “reasonable” and “credible” in light of the
feeling rules of law and society, including in circumstances when anger
would be a fitting response to their experiences.60 As I intimated above,
the right to express anger has not been recognized and affirmed in men and
women equally. Anger has long been considered riotous and disruptive
in women and subjected to legal restriction, medical pathologization,
and biopolitical control on that basis.61 Community-based norms and
structures continue to perpetuate harmful ideas about the “excessive” and
“unbridled” nature of women’s emotions, with anger being relegated to the
realm of female sentimentality as a means of pre-empting its translation
into feminist rage.62 Anger is less threatening to male power if women are
56. Kamari Maxine Clarke, Affective Justice: The International Criminal Court and the PanAfricanist Pushback (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019).
57. Ibid at 5.
58. Ibid at 6.
59. Ibid.
60. Srinivasan, supra note 42 at 127.
61. Anger is a characteristic of the historically feminized conditions of paranoia and hysteria. See
Elizabeth V Spelman, “Anger and Insubordination” in Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall, eds, Women,
Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989)
at 264; Elaine Showalter, Hystories: Hysterial Epidemics and Modern Media (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997) at 9-10; Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Use of Metaphor and Narrative to
Construct Gendered Hysteria in the Courts” (2002) 1:2 JL & Equal 155 at 161; Ruthann Robson,
“Sexual Justice, Student Scholarship and the So-Called Seven Sins” (2010) 19:1 Law & Sexuality 31
at 49; Shani Orgad & Rosalind Gill, “Safety Valves for Mediated Female Rage in the #MeToo Era”
(2019) 19:4 Feminist Media Studies 596 at 597.
62. Orgad & Gill, supra note 61 at 597, citing Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The
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forced to turn inwards and redirect their emotions onto something else.
Pleas for calm are frequently assertions of prevailing ideologies, therefore,
which regulate women’s anger to bring about conformity with gendered
power structures.63
There is a particularly strong link between racialized women and
anger. Lorde entreats racialized women to “focus” their anger on white
supremacy and other systems of oppression: “Every woman has a wellstocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions,
personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused
with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress
and change.”64 However, the prevalence of the “black rage” and “angry
black woman” tropes position racialized women as always already angry
in order to render their “excess” of anger unreasonable.65 Expressing anger
is a perilous endeavour for racialized women who have been systematically
denied the resources, opportunities, and process required to “focus” their
emotion in a “socially acceptable” manner. The risks of misinterpretation
and community backlash have forced many racialized women to choose
between the harms of feeling publicly on the one hand and self-preservation
on the other.66 Critical analysis of the emotions requires a recognition of
the fact that our society is constituted by feeling rules that impress upon
racialized women and other historically marginalized groups differently.
Considering the patterns of repression that I canvassed above, the
progress of campus sexual violence reform suggests that a fundamental
shift in the power, visibility, and transmission of affect is taking place.
Emotions travel in legal and political struggles.67 Emotions gain meaning
Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2008) at 10.
63. Jaggar, supra note 29 at 163-165.
64. Lorde, supra note 51 at 8. For complementary takes on the role of anger in combatting white
supremacy, see James Baldwin et al, “The Negro in American Culture” (1961) 11:3 CrossCurrents 205;
bell hooks, Killing Rage: Ending Racism (New York: Henry Holt, 1995) at 19-20; Debra Thompson,
“An Exoneration of Black Rage” (2017) 116:3 South Atlantic Q 457 at 460, 473.
65. See Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010) at 68
[Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness]; Brittney Cooper, Eloquent Rage: A Black Feminist Discovers Her
Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018) at 5-6; Pamela J Smith, “Teaching the Retrenchment
Generation: When Sapphire Meets Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority” (1999)
6:1 Wm & Mary J Women & L 53 at 115; Charmaine C Williams, “The Angry Black Woman Scholar”
(2001) 13:2 NWSA J 87; Kim, supra note 42 at 473; Thompson, supra note 64 at 461-464.
66. See Srinivasan, supra note 42 at 135-136; Jilly Boyce Kay & Sarah Banet-Weiser, “Feminist
Anger and Feminist Respair” (2019) 19:4 Feminist Media Studies 603 at 605.
67. The circulation of emotion beyond and between individual subjectivities—a phenomenon that is
captured by the terms “emotional contagion” and “affective transmission”—is a major focus of both
psychological research and cultural studies of affect. See Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies” (2004) 22:2 Soc
Text 117 at 120 [Ahmed, “Affective Economies”]; Ahmed, Cultural Politics, supra note 34 at 59;
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and value as their affective resonances circulate among people and
places. Conditions in women’s lives inspire different emotional reactions
depending on whether a person takes a narrow and isolated or a more
broad, systemic, and collective view of them. Consistent with this idea,
research on the #MeToo movement reveals that many complainants felt
“moved” into coming forward out of collective frustration, outrage, and
wanting to be heard and make a difference for women.68 Recent massmarketed books by Soraya Chemaly (Rage Becomes Her), Gemma Hartley
(Fed Up), and Rebecca Traister (Good and Mad) have embraced the role
of anger in feminist consciousness raising, capturing both the social mood
and the legal and political style of the moment.69
Most of these developments have been progressive and illuminating
to feminism because they have created opportunities for women to
engage on more free and equal terms. However, the role of emotions is
more contradictory and ambivalent than this narrative suggests. Could
there be knowledges and experiences of justice that are relevant to the
transformation of gendered and intersectional power structures, but
which have been overlooked in parts of feminism because they feel less
emotionally gratifying and therefore less fulfilling to our sense of what
justice means? Relatively little work explores the effects of public feeling,
relationality, and embodiment in feminist legal scholarship. Even less work
explores the limits and exclusions of such “regimentations of feelings,” as
Clarke puts it, and their constraints on our perceptions of what counts as
feminist in campus sexual violence cases. These are challenging issues
that require a much longer treatment to explore comprehensively. In the
next section, I provide my initial and admittedly partial reflections on what
it means to feel justice as a feminist, focusing on the Dalhousie Dentistry
Kristyn Gorton, “Theorizing Emotion and Affect: Feminist Engagements” (2007) 8:3 Feminist Theory
333 at 337-339; Margaret Wetherell, Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding
(London: Sage, 2012) at 140; Sara Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2017) at 22 [Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life]. For legal commentary on this phenomenon, see
Elizabeth F Emens, “The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA”
(2006) 94:2 Geo LJ 399 at 432-435; Kathryn Abrams, “Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights” (2011)
46:2 Harv CR-CLL Rev 551 at 555; Illan rua Wall, “The Ordinary Affects of Law” (2019) L, Culture
& Humanities 1 at 15; Clare Gunby & Anna Carline, “The Emotional Particulars of Working on Rape
Cases: Doing Dirty Work, Managing Emotional Dirt and Conceptualizing ‘Tempered Indifference’”
(2020) 60:2 Brit J Crim 343 at 345; Kim, supra note 42 at 457-458.
68. See Kaitlynn Mendes & Jessica Ringrose, “Digital Feminist Activism: #MeToo and the Everyday
Experiences of Challenging Rape Culture” in Bianca Fileborn & Rachel Loney-Howes, eds, #MeToo
and the Politics of Social Change (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019) at 37.
69. Soraya Chemaly, Rage Becomes Her: The Power of Women’s Anger (New York: Atria Books,
2018); Gemma Hartley, Fed Up: Emotional Labor, Women, and the Way Forward (New York:
HarperCollins, 2018); Rebecca Traister, Good and Mad: The Revolutionary Power of Women’s Anger
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
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case to illustrate how the circulation of affect shaped the terms of my legal
advocacy in politically illuminating and incendiary ways.
II. Reflections on the Dalhousie Dentistry case
The term “feminist flashpoints” captures the effects of reading emotionally
triggering reports of campus sexual violence and other harms of gender
and sexuality on the feminist legal imagination. Feminist flashpoints
operate through light and fire. Banet-Weiser explains: “[Flashpoints] can
light up an issue and show us the importance, the urgency, of feminist
politics. They move feminism into the spotlight. They are also hot, in
that gendered abuses of power can ignite and encourage a quick response
and commentary.”70 According to Banet-Weiser, the combination of light
and fire can lead us to formulate opinions that obscure the issues they
aim to illuminate—in media circles, they are called “hot takes.”71 BanetWeiser writes: “The hot take depends on the same capitalist circuits of
media visibility that provide the light for a flashpoint. These capitalist
conditions become the grounding for much of popular feminism, where
it is easier to personalize than to critique structure, easier to moralize than
to historicize.”72
I focus the remainder of this section on the combined effects of these
two elements, light and fire, on the progress of campus sexual violence
reform. In the first subsection below, I reflect on my emotional reactions
to the Facebook group in the Dalhousie Dentistry case. My personal
experience attests to the ways that feminist student activism has relied on
emotions to raise the public’s awareness about the nature and severity of
campus sexual violence. In the second subsection below, I reflect on my
emotional reactions to the restorative justice process in the case. Crucially,
I suggest there is a contingent relationship between emotion and the
“common sense” ideology of crime logic that has controlled many feminist
perceptions, including my own, of what counts as justice in campus sexual
violence cases.
1. Lighting a spark: the role of emotions in exposing rape culture
I remember what I felt when I heard about the Facebook group for the
first time. A feminist and LGBTQ2 rights advocate, I was an LL.M.
student at Harvard Law School in the 2014–2015 year, a place steeped in
public intellectual debates surrounding campus sexual violence and the
enforcement of Title IX, a US law requiring gender equity in federally
70.
71.
72.

Banet-Weiser, supra note 26.
Ibid.
Ibid [emphasis removed].
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funded education programs.73 It was a combination of emotions—
insecurity, frustration, hopelessness, and rage—feelings that I shared with
feminist colleagues who expressed the same feelings to me. Campus was
already buzzing about the presence of Patrick Witt, a first-year student
at the law school, who published a controversial Boston Globe op-ed in
November 2014 claiming that a sexual harassment policy had “nearly
ruined [his] life.”74 Reactions to the Witt affair were prelude to a muchlarger controversy surrounding the release of the popular documentary,
The Hunting Ground, in February 2015, which criticized the law school
for its handling of sexual assault charges against one of its former students,
Brandon Winston.75 I recall vividly the impression of these events encircling
me, creating a sense of connection and means of engagement with my
colleagues who experienced the same thing, reinforcing the legitimacy of
my emotions and compounding their effects.
Enlightening people about the nature and severity of campus sexual
violence is a necessary first step toward addressing the problem. Emotions
play an important role in this recognition function, signalling to the public
that women and other historically marginalized groups recognize the harms
being done to them. In the social movement literature, the recognition that
a person has been wronged is said to constitute a “moral shock.”76 The
recognition can inspire a range of emotions that vary with the nature and
severity of the shock, leading one to conclude that the shock resulted from
a harm that needs addressing.77 Kathryn Abrams explains: “Apprehending
this [moral] shock—understanding that one has sustained an injury—may
be the initial stage of this reorientation; but this perception is followed by
an equally important phase of interpretation. The affected individual must
perceive the effect as something that is not an inevitable state of affairs,
but is rather a development to which she might productively respond.”78
Responses to moral shocks are both individually and collectively generated
because they are influenced by a person’s relationships with other people,
conditioned by our participation in broader social movements and the
circulation of affect within them: “Affective connections with others…

73. 20 USC §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
74. Patrick Witt, “A Sexual Harassment Policy That Nearly Ruined My Life,” The Boston Globe
(3 November 2014), online: <www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/03/sexual-harassment-policythat-nearly-ruined-life/hY3XrZrOdXjvX2SSvuciPN/story.html> [perma.cc/JBM2-A9LG].
75. The Hunting Ground (New York: The Weinstein Company, 2015).
76. See James M Jasper, “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around
Social Movements” (1998) 13:3 Sociological Forum 397 at 409.
77. See Abrams, supra note 67 at 554.
78. Ibid.
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may permit individuals to perceive patterns of injury that they would have
been unable to identify on their own.”79
Most immediately, the revelation of the Facebook group reminded
me about the urgency of my feminist mandate. It revealed campus sexual
violence to be a cause and effect of substantive inequality between men
and women. There could be no denying the nature and severity of the issue
any longer. It was clearly visible for everyone to see, splayed in the crudest
and most explicit of terms, “hate fuck,” across the front pages of national
newspapers. I imagined that the men felt comfortable repeating the word
online, performing the fact of their will to rape their classmates whom they
hated, apparently, in a sexually violent expression of masculine bravado.
I thought about the effects of the Facebook group on female students at
Dalhousie, some of whom reported feeling unsafe around the men after the
story broke, and potential risks to the broader patient community in light of
the men’s comments about sexual assault.80 The fact of the women’s harm,
considered in light of the men’s status as privileged wrongdoers holding
on to privileged positions at an elite and highly competitive professional
school, made me angry.
Among other things, my emotional reactions to the Facebook group
conveyed the fact that Canadians are living in a “rape culture.” The
feminist literature is rife with critiques of the concept.81 Coined in 1993,
“rape culture” has been defined as a social and cultural continuum of ideas,
expressions, practices, and structures in which campus sexual violence is

79. Ibid at 555. Lauren Berlant comments on the circulation of pain within social movements in
terms that resonate with Abrams’s work: “Pain thus organizes your specific experience of the world,
separating you from others and connecting you with others similarly shocked (but not surprised) by
the strategies of violence that constantly regenerate the bottom of the hierarchies of social value you
inhabit.” Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics” in Wendy Brown
& Janet Halley, eds, Left Legalism / Left Critique (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) at 123.
80. Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 25.
81. For commentary on rape culture at Canadian schools, see Elizabeth Quinlan, “Introduction:
Sexual Violence in the Ivory Tower” in Elizabeth Quinlan et al, eds, Sexual Violence at Canadian
Universities: Activism, Institutional Responses, and Strategies for Change (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier
University Press, 2017) 1 at 6-7; Nicole K Jeffrey et al, “‘Strangers Are Unsafe’: Institutionalized
Rape Culture and the Complexity of Addressing University Women’s Safety Concerns” in Diane
Crocker, Joanne Minaker, & Amanda Nelund, eds, Violence Interrupted: Confronting Sexual Violence
on University Campuses (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 141 at 142-143. For
critical takes on rape culture discourse, see Tuulia Law, “Towards Acknowledging the Ambiguities
of Sex: Questioning Rape Culture and Consent-Based Approaches to Sexual Assault Prevention” in
Crocker, Minaker & Nelund, eds, (ibid at 263); Aya Gruber, “Anti-Rape Culture” (2016) 64:4 U Kan L
Rev 1027; Ummni Khan, “The Rhetoric of Rape Culture” (5 December 2016), online: Centre for Free
Expression <cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2016/12/rhetoric-rape-culture> [perma.cc/E2LD-PMY9]; Laura
Kipnis, Unwanted Advances: Sexual Paranoia Comes to Campus (New York: HarperCollins, 2017) at
18.
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routinely encouraged, condoned, and covered up as banal.82 The concept
originates in Susan Brownmiller’s radical feminist text Against Our Will,
published in 1975, in which Brownmiller argues that the “ideology of
rape is fueled by cultural values that are perpetuated at every level of our
society.”83 Catharine MacKinnon comments on the effects of rape culture:
“One explanation for the persistence and prevalence of campus sexual
assault is that some college cultures support it. Studies suggest that rape
cultures are fostered on college campuses when rape by acquaintances or
dates—most frequently but not exclusively of women students by men
students—is an encouraged and accepted, even integral, part of campus
life.”84
Campus sexual violence, like rape culture, is a diffuse target. Campus
sexual violence has been defined by feminist law and policymakers to
include everything from crude jokes about sex to flirting aggressively,
catcalling, flashing and exposing oneself, gender stereotyping, revenge
porn or image-based sexual abuse, rape chants, sexual harassment, “stealth”
condom removal, and sexual assault.85 As such, campus sexual violence
is a highly politicized and not always legal category, including grounds
for sanction that would have little traction off campus.86 Illustrating this,
campus sexual violence is defined by a Canadian study led by Mallory
Harrigan, published in 2020, to include “physical violence” as well as
“heteropatriarchal speech and behaviours that encourage or justify sexual
victimization,” including “sexually degrading remarks and victim-blaming
rhetoric.”87 Harrigan’s study suggests that heteropatriarchal speech is
problematic regardless of whether it is legally actionable as a form of
sexual harassment under Canadian human rights laws. Feminist law and
policymakers have sought to expand the relevant field of vision in order
to subject a broader range of behaviours to legal and critical scrutiny—an
82. See Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher & Martha Ross, eds, Transforming a Rape Culture
(Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 1993).
83. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1975) at 437.
84. Catharine A MacKinnon, “In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual
Harassment in Education” (2016) 125:7 Yale LJ 2038 at 2056.
85. See Claire Potter, “Does Title IX Work” (2017), online: Signs: Short Takes <signsjournal.org/
unwanted-advances/#potter> [perma.cc/LX8M-C8Z9]; Heidi Matthews, “#MeToo as Sex Panic” in
Fileborn & Loney-Howes, supra note 68, 267 at 272-273. For commentary in the #MeToo context,
see Brenda Cossman, “#MeToo, Sex Wars 2.0 and the Power of Law” (2019) 3:1 Asian YB Human
Rights & Humanitarian L 18; Eva Cherniavsky, “Keyword 1: #MeToo” (2019) 30:1 differences 15 at
15; Matthews (ibid at 275).
86. Potter, supra note 85.
87. Mallory Harrigan et al, “Understanding Students’ Intentions to Intervene to Prevent Sexual
Violence: A Canadian Study” in Crocker, Minaker & Nelund, supra note 81, 164 at 165.
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important objective if one believes that rape culture is an “encouraged and
accepted, even integral, part of campus life.”
Broad definitions of campus sexual violence rely on a rhetorical trope
called the copula, or the postulation of equivalences—crude jokes and
catcalling and flashing and stealthing and sexual assault, etc.88 Many
years ago, Sharon Marcus referred to the same trope as the “collapsed
continuum” in the feminist modeling of rape by writers like MacKinnon
and Liz Kelly.89 Commenting on this phenomenon, Joseph Fischel criticizes
parts of Title IX enforcement for “lumping” together and flattening more
and less serious types of campus sexual violence without making clear the
legal distinctions between them.90 The strong implication from this kind
of “lumping” rhetoric is that rape culture is everywhere. The breadth and
severity of the problem is intended to feel overwhelming, inescapable. It is
a telling coincidence that shortly before the Facebook group came down,
the male students’ phrase “hate fuck” appeared in media reports about
former CBC radio host and accused rapist Jian Ghomeshi’s treatment of
his female colleagues at work.91 Similarly, the men’s comment about a rag
smelling like chloroform was based on a comment from the hit television
show Family Guy, in which a male character uses the rag to render a
woman unconscious.92
Eliciting affect is one of the primary purposes of such “lumping”
rhetoric. Emotions can ratchet up or down the moral significance of
something. Generally speaking, the more emotionally affecting the
problem is, the more visible it becomes and the more pressing the need to
88. See Judith Butler, “Against Proper Objects” (1994) 6:2/3 differences 1 at 9; Janet Halley, Split
Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006) at 193.
89. Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention”
in Judith Butler & Joan W Scott, eds, Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992)
385 at 389. For Kelly’s work on the continuum, see Liz Kelly, “The Continuum of Sexual Violence”
in Jalna Hanmer & Mary Maynard, eds, Women, Violence and Social Control (New York: Macmillan
Press, 1987) 46; Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988). For
commentary on the radical feminist and dominance feminist origins of this work, see Judith Lorber,
Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2005) at 119; Vanessa
E Munro, “From Consent to Coercion: Evaluating International and Domestic Frameworks for
the Criminalization of Rape” in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E Munro, eds, Rethinking Rape Law:
International and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2010) 17 at 18.
90. See Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 2019) at 173; Joseph J Fischel, “Catharine MacKinnon’s Wayward
Children” (2019) 30:1 differences 34 at 37 [Fischel, “Catharine”]. See also Andrew Peyser, “#MeToo
Has Lumped Trivial in with Legitimate Sexual Assault” (17 November 2017), online: New York Post
<nypost.com/2017/11/17/metoo-has-lumped-trivial-in-with-legitimate-sexual-assault/> [perma.cc/
B8J7-967Z].
91. See Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 42.
92. Ibid.
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address it feels. Consider the title of The Hunting Ground, which suggests
that sexual predators have declared open season on “hunting” innocent
women and girls.93 The figure of the rape victim is compelling to many
of us because of the emotions that it evokes—fear, shock, anger—and the
moral indignation that surrounds the cause of protecting them.94 Colleges
and universities have similarly adopted a “rape crisis” framing of campus
sexual violence, with many schools partnering with community rape
crisis centres to address a problem that is presumed to be as proximate,
widespread, and devastating as the term “crisis” suggests.95 The Chancellor
of the University of Ottawa has called rape culture a terrible “disease”
that “needs to be curbed and then cured.”96 Framings of campus sexual
violence as an “epidemic,” “emergency,” and “scourge” have operated
in the same way, creating the impression that rape culture has infected
the body politic and may be getting worse.97 The exceptionalism of rape
culture resonates less with the feeling that campus sexual violence is new
and unusual, but that campus sexual violence is a moral issue and evidence
of a growing social “crisis” and “disorder” that is potentially incurable.98
Reflecting on this operation, I can personally attest to the ways
that feminist student activism has relied on the collective generation,
representation, and circulation of affect in the service of campus sexual
violence reform. My emotional responses to the Facebook group helped
to organize my experiences as an activist, connecting me with feminist
colleagues who were similarly affected by the structures of male domination
and female subordination—rape culture—that we felt and therefore knew
to exist. Emotions bore witness to the truth and authenticity of our relative
subject positions as women, LGBTQ2 people, and members of other
historically marginalized groups. Collectively, our emotions levelled a
clear and powerful indictment of the colleges and universities that failed
93. For another example, see Kelly Oliver, Hunting Girls: Sexual Violence from ‘The Hunger
Games’ to Campus Rape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
94. See Fischel, “Catharine,” supra note 90 at 47. For more on the role of indignation in social
movements, see Abrams, supra note 67 at 577.
95. See Jamie R Abrams, “The #MeToo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique of Rape
Crisis Framing” (2018) 52:4 U Rich L Rev 749 at 759-761; Jennifer S Hirsch & Shamus Khan, Sexual
Citizens: A Landmark Study of Sex, Power, and Assault on Campus (New York: WW Norton, 2020) at
211.
96. See e.g. Brian Hutchinson, “Is There an Epidemic of ‘Rape Culture’ at Canadian Universities?,”
National Post (7 March 2014), online: <nationalpost.com/news/is-there-an-epidemic-of-rape-cultureat-canadian-universities> [perma.cc/EXR7-42BC].
97. Ibid. See also Gruber, supra note 81 at 1032.
98. For a complementary take on the exceptionalism of hate crimes, see Leslie J Moran, “The
Emotional Dimensions of Lesbian and Gay Demands for Hate Crime Reform” (2004) 49:4 McGill LJ
925 at 935.
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to handle complaints of campus sexual violence in a timely and effective
manner—a story that was not being heard or publicly acknowledged to
our emotional satisfaction. As such, our emotions fed into the means of
our feminist resistance and critique of the institutions that made us feel
insecure, frustrated, hopeless, and angry in the first place. Emotions
were instrumental to our process of feminist mobilization because they
provided the necessary motivation to both struggle and express our legal
and political grievances to the world.
2. Playing with fire: the role of emotions in punishing rape culture
My interest in the relationship between law, gender, and equality is
inspired by longstanding concerns about feminism’s complicity with the
carceral state. Previously, I explained that the restorative justice process in
the Dalhousie Dentistry case was conducted under constant threat of being
terminated. Feminist critics were extremely vocal about the perceived
weakness of the university’s response at the time, with many of their
objections expressing the view that restorative justice was too “soft on
crime” and failed to “take sexual abuse seriously.” Isabelle Côté wrote
in the Huffington Post Canada that restorative justice was a “depiction
of rape culture” that required a more punitive response: “No wonder all
13 of those male students agreed to participate in the [restorative justice]
process; it constitutes an easy way out considering the severity of their
actions and the risk of expulsion from the school.”99 I remember feeling
something similar upon hearing about the restorative justice process at
the time. It felt like the male students were getting a mere slap on the
wrist, like colleges and universities had found yet another way to sweep
the problem of campus sexual violence under the rug. The breadth and
severity of the male students’ conduct made me angry, but the prospect
of the men finding an “easy way out” and the university escaping a more
searching review of its climate and culture made me angrier still.
Feminist debates about campus sexual violence reform have been
characterized by a particular feminist orthodoxy about what “taking sexual
abuse seriously” requires. Amanda Nelund reviewed the content of campus
sexual violence policies at 43 colleges and universities between May 2016
and August 2017, one of the most comprehensive Canadian studies of
its kind.100 According to Nelund, most policies state that complainants
99. Isabelle Côté, “Restorative Justice at Dalhousie is a Depiction of Rape Culture” (18 December
2014), online (blog): Huffington Post <www.huffingtonpost.ca/isabelle-cote/restorative-justice-is-a_b_6347818.html> [perma.cc/4PZM-BD2K].
100. Amanda Nelund, “New Policies, Old Problems? Problematizing University Policies” in Crocker,
Minaker & Nelund, supra note 81 at 223.
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can choose how their complaints will be processed, but choices are
often limited to whether complaints will trigger a criminal process,
campus adjudication, or no response at all.101 Additionally, most policies
encourage complainants to report their experiences to campus security
services.102 Some policies provide that complainants have informational
and participatory rights in campus adjudication, but complainant
involvement in the process is relatively limited.103 Complainants are free
to stop engaging with campus adjudication at any time, but most policies
establish the university’s right to proceed with an investigation or hearing
without the complainants’ consent.104 There are parallels to the criminal
justice system here, specifically the police or prosecutor’s sole right,
depending on the province, to decide whether to proceed with laying
charges. Correspondingly, Nelund finds that few of the policies create
opportunities for complainants and respondents to engage in relational
dialogue or community-based norm clarification around campus sexual
violence.105 Provisions on consensual dispute resolution, where they exist,
are often brief and unelaborated or significantly limited in their availability
to students. Most colleges and universities have revised their policies
since Nelund’s study was conducted, but her findings remain accurate. In
a forthcoming book chapter, Diane Crocker and Gena Dufour review these
developments and conclude that as of May 2021, “campus sexual violence
policies have replicated the disadvantages of criminal justice responses to
gender-based violence and have not adopted the advantages of restorative
justice approaches.”106
Make no mistake—campus sexual violence policies are civil in nature;
the cases involve private parties; and as I explained above, the procedures
apply to conduct that may or may not be independently prosecutable as
crimes. Nevertheless, I would argue that the structure of campus sexual
violence policies reflects the acceptance of what Donna Coker calls “crime
logic” in the Title IX context, a set of beliefs and attitudes about the role
of the carceral state in regulating and punishing campus sexual violence.107
101. Ibid at 231.
102. Ibid at 232.
103. See Karen Busby & Joanna Birenbaum, Achieving Fairness: A Guide to Campus Sexual Violence
Complaints (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2020) at 60-61.
104. See Nelund, supra note 100 at 231.
105. Ibid.
106. Diane Crocker & Gena Dufour, “Developing Campus Anti-Violence Policies: Lessons Learned
from the Criminalization of Gender-Based Violence” in Christopher Dietzel & Shaheen Sharrif, eds,
iMPACTS: Reclaiming the Role of Universities to Address Sexual Violence through Multi-Sector
Partnerships in Law, Arts, and Social Media (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming] at
20.
107. Donna Coker, “Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice” (2016) 49:1 Tex
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Crime logic is reflected by the following characteristics: (a) a focus on
individual legal responsibility rather than on collective accountability; (b)
a disdain for policy attention to the social determinants of behaviour; (c)
a preference for narratives that feature bad actors and innocent victims;
and (d) a preference for punishing and removing individuals who have
harmed others from society.108 The elements of crime logic correspond
almost exactly to Elizabeth Bernstein’s critique of “carceral feminism,”
which is a term that captures feminism’s complicity with a reactionary,
neoliberal politics of crime control, blurring social justice and criminal
justice, punishing in the name of gender equality.109 Crime logic is
predicated on the commission of reciprocal acts of carceral state violence
against individual perpetrators. In many cases, it functions like a neoliberal
publicity stunt. Colleges and universities cleanse themselves of financial
and reputational risk by exacting swift and harsh punishments on targeted
individuals, returning the community to its previously “safe” condition
while, in fact, the systemic problem is left unaddressed.110
Critical theories of law and the emotions help to explain the prevalence
of these trends. Arguably, crime logic is evidence of a phenomenon that
Jonathan Simon calls “governing through crime,” whereby “crime and
the forms of knowledge historically associated with it…[have become
powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms of social action
[areas] as a problem for governance.”111 Extrapolating out from the Title
IX context, Simon explains that law and policymakers have engendered a
culture of fear by promulgating legal regulations to combat the ostensible
pervasiveness of crime.112 Fear operates by making the audience believe
Tech L Rev 147 at 156.
108. Ibid.
109. See Elizabeth Bernstein, “The Sexual Politics of the ‘New Abolitionism’” (2007) 18:3
differences 128; Elizabeth Bernstein, “Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The ‘Traffic in Women’
and Neoliberal Circuits of Crime, Sex, and Rights” in David M Halperin & Trevor Hoppe, eds, The
War on Sex (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017) 297. For complementary takes on feminism’s
complicity with the carceral state, see Angela Y Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven
Stories Press, 2003); Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the
Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Judith
Levine & Erica R Meiners, The Feminist and the Sex Offender: Confronting Sexual Harm, Ending
State Violence (London, UK: Verso, 2020); Margo Kaplan, “Reconciling #MeToo and Criminal
Justice” (2020) 17:2 Ohio St J Crim L 361; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime: The Unexpected
Role of Women’s Liberation in Mass Incarceration (Oakland, CA: University of California Press,
2020).
110. See Alison Phipps, “The Fight Against Sexual Violence” (2019) 71:1 Soundings: J Politics &
Culture 62 at 68, 71-72; Lisa Duggan, “The Full Catastrophe” (18 August 2018), online (blog): Bully
Bloggers <bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2018/08/18/the-full-catastrophe/> [perma.cc/Q7L3-2NNE].
111. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 17.
112. Ibid at 4-7.
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that crime is imminent and threatening.113 The production of fear has been
so effective and widespread that it became directed at individuals who are
neither current nor prospective criminals, strengthening the carceral state
in the process.114 Simon writes: “At its core, the implicit fallacy dominating
many school policy debates today consists of a gross conﬂation of virtually
all the vulnerabilities of children and youth into variations on the theme of
crime.”115 Fischel’s critique of “lumping” rhetoric and similarly evocative,
sensationalist language reveals the effects of power and discourse that
such representations of campus “crime” produce.
Postulating in a similar vein, Wendy Brown suggests that when
feminist law and policymakers make emotional appeals to women’s fearful,
traumatized subjectivity by campus sexual violence or otherwise, they run
the risk of performing and circulating feelings of victimhood in reality.
According to Brown, the criminal justice system contains an incitement to
what Friedrich Nietzsche calls ressentiment, or the “moralizing revenge of
the powerless.”116 Brown writes: “Ressentiment in this context is a triple
achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms
the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a
site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer
has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche’s
term, “anaesthetize”) and externalize what is otherwise ‘unendurable.’”117
If the cause of ressentiment is women’s victimhood, the creative process
of ressentiment is reworking this condition into a negative form of action
by establishing it as a measure of social virtue.118 Rather than transforming
victimhood into something else, the creative process of ressentiment
externalizes the condition by legitimizing the state’s role in punishing the
individuals responsible for causing it.119
The study of feminist legal imagination is a critical inquiry into the
reference points through which feminist law and policymakers construct,
113. See Marta Gil, “Emotions and Political Rhetoric: Perception of Danger, Group Conflict and the
Biopolitics of Fear” (2016) 26:2 Human Affairs 212 at 220. For more on the links between fear and
crime control, see Moran, supra note 98 at 938-939; Rachel F Moran, “Fear: A Story in Three Parts”
(2004) 69:4 Mo L Rev 1013 at 1027-1029; Roger N Lancaster, Sex Panic and the Punitive State
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) at 15.
114. Simon, supra note 111 at 260-261.
115. Ibid at 209.
116. Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995) at 66-67.
117. Ibid at 68.
118. Ibid at 70.
119. Ibid. I have written about the potential of ADR and restorative justice to transcend the constitutive
limitations of politicized identity elsewhere. See Daniel Del Gobbo, “Queer Dispute Resolution”
(2019) 20:2 Cardozo J Conflict Resolution 283.
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maintain, and reproduce mental images in the legal field.120 Crime logic is
a complex legal and political operation. I cannot trace its foundations in a
comprehensive way in this article, but it strikes me that emotions must be
partially responsible for constructing its rational claims and lending them
moral force. Simon and Brown provide compelling accounts of the role
of fear, anger, and vengeance in rationalizing carceral norms and logics.
My point in highlighting these emotions is not to commit the “genetic
fallacy”—the fallacy of thinking that the nature or falsity of a proposition
(crime logic) can be demonstrated by a causal claim concerning the
origins of the belief in that proposition (fear, anger, etc.) as false, corrupt,
or otherwise less than.121 Empirical evidence shows that the falsity of
crime logic can be established by other means.122 Rather, my point is to
highlight that emotions provide one of the rhetorical and epistemological
bases on which the rationality of crime logic has been established. Many
community members feel that by exacting legal punishments and other
forms of discipline, something meaningful has been done about campus
sexual violence.
Correspondingly, I would argue that central to understanding the role
of emotions in legitimizing the carceral state is recognizing a corollary
claim about the role of emotions in fostering skepticism of theories and
methodologies that challenge the carceral state. One of the co-facilitators
of the restorative justice process in the Dalhousie Dentistry case, Jennifer
Llewellyn, suggests that “[t]he certainty offered by [formal] systems
resulted in considerable disappointment, occasionally rising to the level
of outrage, that restorative justice had denied what was deserved or owed
according to the existing formal processes.”123 The certainty of punishment
was so engrained in the case, Llewellyn suggests, that it effected an
epistemic occupation with criminal justice, causing some feminists to
experience “profound difficulty imagining and conceptualizing the redress
and prevention of violence (including state violence) without recourse
to the heteropatriarchal violence of the state.”124 Arguably, the cognitive
120. Maksymilian Del Mar provides the following definition of imagination in his work on the legal
imagination: “the process of deliberately and effortfully constructing mental images of what it might
be like for someone else to experience a certain situation.” Del Mar, supra note 28 at 148.
121. See Jeffrie G Murphy, “Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the ‘Clumsy
Moral Philosophy’ of Jesus Christ” in Bandes, ed, supra note 30, 149 at 150-151. For more on the
genetic fallacy, see Kevin C Klement, “When is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious” (2002) 16:4
Argumentation 383.
122. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.
123. Llewellyn, supra note 22 at 139. According to Llewellyn, “[the response] was the product of
an inability and/or unwillingness to understand because it would disrupt the power of those with
regulatory authority or who took comfort in established and formal systems” (ibid at 139-140).
124. Ibid at 140, citing Brady T Heiner & Sarah K Tyson, “Feminism and the Carceral State: Gender-
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process is similar to what Maksymilian Del Mar calls the “affective
dimension of imaginative resistance,” citing the challenges that arise
“when a subject is asked to imagine a particular situation, but is either
unable or unwilling to do so.”125
Recall that feminist student activists lined the streets to publicly
condemn the male students’ conduct in the case, holding signs that read
“Expel Misogyny,” “We Want Names,” and “Expel Rape Culture.”
The political resonance of these framings is inextricably bound up in
collectively generated experiences of “good victimhood” and “bad
victimhood,” emphasizing the vulnerability of “good victims” in particular,
most often white, heterosexual, cisgender, and class-privileged women,
who are presumed to be fearful and traumatized and therefore most in need
of the state’s protection.126 Consistent with this view, feminist critics of
the restorative justice process petitioned the university to conduct a more
punitive process than restorative justice on a parallel track.127 Llewellyn
comments on the influence of more established justice narratives: “The
public demanded—in petitions, tweets, blogs, online posts and on talk
radio—that the University play its traditional part in the justice story. They
were to find the monsters and punish them, ideally by isolating them from
the rest of us by expelling them to make them pay and somehow make us
all richer for their loss.”128
I should not be taken to suggest that the restorative justice process in the
case was conducted without fault. As I mentioned above, feminist critics
raised serious concerns about the restorative justice process at the time,
particularly with respect to female students and other community members
who were harmed by the male students’ conduct, but whose interests could
not be adequately addressed by the process.129 A comprehensive review
Responsive Justice, Community Accountability, and the Epistemology of Antiviolence” (2017) 3:1
Feminist Philosophy Q 1.
125. Del Mar, supra note 28 at 152, citing Magdalena Balcerak Jackson, “On the Epistemic Value
of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving” in Amy Kind & Peter Kung, eds, Knowledge Through
Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 41 at 47.
126. See Theresa A Kulbaga & Leland G Spencer, Campuses of Consent: Sexual and Social Justice
in Higher Education (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2019) at 10, 26. For commentary
on the rape myth of “good victimhood,” see Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and
‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397; Lise Gotell,
“Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and
Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865; Lancaster, supra note 113 at 203; Gunby & Carline,
supra note 67 at 346.
127. See Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 18.
128. Jennifer Llewellyn, Amanda Demsey & Jillian Smith, “An Unfamiliar Justice Story: Restorative
Justice and Education: Reflections on Dalhousie’s Facebook Incident 2015” (2015) 25:1 Our Schools
/ Our Selves 43 at 49.
129. Calls on the university to conduct a parallel process to restorative justice were framed, inter
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of procedural fairness and equity considerations in the case is beyond the
scope of this article.130 However, Llewellyn’s observations about what the
male students’ punishment was supposed to make us feel (“richer for their
loss”) resonate with me because they help to explain my initial objections
to the restorative justice process. The circulation of affect contributed to
a feminist climate in which loud, public calls to punish the male students
—to literally “Expel Misogyny” personified with or without a fair hearing
—felt like it was a legal and political necessity and emotional salve for
the community’s harms. Correspondingly, restorative justice felt like it
was a morally inadequate response to campus “crime” because it failed
to produce a single culprit, a single “monstrous” other to isolate and
condemn, and thus failed to assuage my emotions in a manner consistent
with crime logic. As such, emotions provided one of the rhetorical and
epistemological bases on which restorative justice was conceived as a
form of “weak justice,” insufficiently “tough on crime,” and therefore
outside the bounds of feminist action.
Looking ahead, feminist law and policymakers should instrumentalize
the power of feminist flashpoints to build community and solidarity, raise
political consciousness, and take moral action on campus sexual violence.
Reflecting on my reactions to the restorative justice process, however, I
am concerned that the powerful, galvanizing force of light and fire has
caused our feminist politics to flashover. The prevalence of crime logic
suggests that it is often easier to moralize than to historicize about gender
and sexuality. It is often easier to punish a few “bad apples” who abused
their power advantage over women than to challenge the structural
conditions that have facilitated power advantages in our society, often but
not always along gender-based lines, which is more complicated and can
feel less emotionally gratifying to us. In feminist legal cultures steeped in
alia, as responding to the needs of female students in the faculty who chose not to participate in
restorative justice and reported that they were prevented from accessing more formal complaint
options. See Backhouse Report, supra note 1 at 18; Aly Thomson, “Dalhousie Professors Go Public
with Complaint Against Dentistry Students,” The Globe and Mail (4 January 2015), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/national/dalhousie-professors-go-public-with-complaint-againstdentistry-students/article22283414/> [perma.cc/DG3N-JZEK]; “Dalhousie Students Condemn
Restorative Justice in Facebook Scandal,” CBC News (6 January 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/nova-scotia/dalhousie-students-condemn-restorative-justice-in-facebook-scandal-1.2891365>
[perma.cc/XTF4-VBKK]. The facilitators of the restorative justice process and other students in the
faculty contested these reports. See Llewellyn Report, supra note 12 at 26.
130. I canvas a range of feminist perspectives on the use of consensual dispute resolution in campus
sexual violence cases in two recent works, albeit without exploring the role of emotions in depth.
See Daniel Del Gobbo, “The Return of the Sex Wars: Contesting Rights and Interests in Campus
Sexual Violence Reform” in Crocker, Minaker & Nelund, eds, supra note 81 at 87; Daniel Del Gobbo,
“Feminism in Conversation: Campus Sexual Violence and the Negotiation Within” (2021) 53:3 UBC
L Rev 591.
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carceral thinking, legal and political formations that feel less gratifying
than punishment are frequently read as an external threat to the politics at
issue, preventing us from engaging with them and constraining our legal
imaginations in the process. The “common sense” ideology of carceral
feminism has pushed complexities about the relationship between law,
gender, and equality into the shadows. “Like the vapor that ignites at a
specific temperature,” Banet-Weiser writes, “hot takes often radically,
but only temporarily, transform the historical contexts of the situation to
which they are responding.”131
In the next and final section, I provide my key takeaways from this
analysis, shifting the focus of the article from reflection to praxis—
evaluating thoughts, feelings, and moral action together to gain perspective
on feminist method and inform our legal and political practices for the
better. On the level of action, how can feminist law and policymakers craft
our emotions in a manner that recognizes the problem of rape culture as
real, while remaining mindful of the potentially harmful consequences
that result from them? How can feminists cultivate our rage at campus
sexual violence into a more critical and effective stance, while resisting the
lure of carceral norms and logics that feel like they are feminist?
III. Feeling beyond carcerality
Central to asking the fundamental praxis question—to asking what can
and should be done—is reminding ourselves of what should not be done.
In my view, feminist law and policymakers should not be told to feel less
or feel differently about the immorality of campus sexual violence. As I
explained previously, Srinivasan’s work reveals the affective injustice that
results from calling on feminists to moderate their emotions according to
white, male, and objectivist standards, as if the primary offence lies not
with the perpetrators of campus sexual violence, but with feminists whose
“excess” of emotions threatens to challenge the institutions that support
them.132 The containment and suppression of feminist rage to meet the
feeling rules of the political majority is a racist and sexist form of emotional
labour.133 Ahmed’s writing on “feminist killjoy” methodology makes this
point clearly.134 Across a wide range of contexts, feminists who “kill joy”
because they contest racism and sexism become the problem when they
express their emotions publicly: “It is because [feminists] expose violence
that we are heard as violent, as if the violence of which we speak originates
131.
132.
133.
134.

Banet-Weiser, supra note 26.
Srinivasan, supra note 42 at 133-134.
See Hochschild, supra note 27 at 7.
See Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, supra note 65 at 20, 50-87.
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in us.” 135 The harms of affective injustice are therefore cyclical: “Through
feminism you make sense of wrongs; you realize that you are not in the
wrong. But when you speak of something as being wrong, you end up
being in the wrong all over again.”136 Ahmed concludes: “It is enough to
make you emotional.”137
Emotions themselves are not right or wrong, feminist or not feminist.
However, emotions can be mobilized in support of carceral state practices
and other moral actions that contradict the mission of substantive
equality. In the previous section, I explained that the causal links between
emotions and action are contingent and non-linear—feelings of rage and
righteousness, to use Brown’s example of ressentiment, may or may not
produce a site of revenge, may or may not lead to retribution, and may
or may not entail the use of carceral state practices—but the possibility
for this kind of progression exists. Concerns about instrumentalization
are not unique to carceral feminism as such. Jeffrie Murphy and Jean
Hampton comment on the emotions associated with carcerality generally:
“[The criminal law] institutionalizes certain feelings of anger, resentment,
and even hatred that we typically (and perhaps properly) direct towards
wrongdoers, especially if we have been victims of those wrongdoers.”138
Emotions provide one of the rhetorical and epistemological bases for the
constitutive, institutional violence of the law to occur writ large.139
None of this is inevitable. Commenting on how feelings of anger are
culturally produced and mediated, Judith Butler observes that “people
craft rage, they cultivate rage, and not just as individuals. Communities
craft their rage. …Collective forms of crafting rage are important. They
don’t deny rage, but they choose not to enter into the cycle of violence.”140
Riffing on Lorde’s point about “focusing” one’s anger on white supremacy
and other systems of oppression, Butler encourages feminists to craft our
emotions for the better, not to meet gender expectations or other ritualized
terms of public life, but to expose violence and counter it without causing
harm in the process.141 Carceral feminism and its law are not fixed, but
135. Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life, supra note 67 at 253.
136. Ibid at 38.
137. Ibid.
138. Jeffrie G Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988) at 2 [emphasis removed].
139. See Robert M Cover, “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95:8 Yale LJ 1601; Austin Sarat & Thomas
R Kearns, “A Journey Through Forgetting: Towards a Jurisprudence of Violence” in Austin Sarat &
Thomas R Kearns, eds, The Fate of Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991) 209.
140. Brandon M Terry & Judith Butler, “The Radical Equality of Lives,” Boston Review (7 January
2020), online: <bostonreview.net/articles/brandon-m-terry-butler-int/> [perma.cc/VK2E-C2JY].
141. Ibid.
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effects of power and discourse that can and must be changed. Crafting our
emotions as part of a radical critique of the carceral state is one way to do
that. Such a crafting process requires feminists to channel and transform
our emotions into a more “engaged” legal and political stance, Ahmed
suggests, to move “from anger into an interpretation of that which one is
against, whereby associations or connections are made between the object
of the anger and broader patterns or structures.”142
As a first step, feminist law and policymakers should examine how
evocative, sensationalist representations of rape culture operate, not to
challenge their truth value, but to consider and evaluate their real-world
consequences, including how these representations feed into publicly
held interests in safety and order. Rhetorical framings of colleges and
universities as being in a state of “crisis” or “emergency” suggest an
imminency to rape culture that lends itself to carceral solutions, including
mandatory reporting and referral policies, campus safety audits, and
increased police presence which might feel like they keep complainants
safe, but have actually proven to be ineffective at addressing campus
sexual violence as a systemic problem.143 The paradigm image of the
fearful, traumatized victim reinforces this connection between crime logic
and campus sexual violence reform. On this point, Aya Gruber charts the
progress of the “feminist war on crime,” showing how claims of campus
sexual violence may be overdetermined and overdrawn, often motivated
by fear, homophobia, racial animus, and other cultural biases about gender
and sexuality.144 As a result, feminist campaigns against campus sexual
violence have leant themselves to criminal prohibitions that target members
of historically marginalized groups, including Black, Indigenous, and
142. Ahmed, Cultural Politics, supra note 34 at 175-178. For an overview of research on the law’s
role in channelling emotions, see Abrams & Keren, supra note 34 at 2054.
143. See Abrams, supra note 95 at 769. For research on the inefficacy of these methods, see Doris
Buss et al, “The Response to Sexual Violence at Ontario University Campuses” (June 2016) at 28,
online (pdf): <www.scribd.com/document/320699612/The-Response-to-Sexual-Violence-at-OntarioUniversity-Campuses> [perma.cc/ZF4J-2J8V]; Erin Collins, “The Criminalization of Title IX” (2016)
13:2 Ohio St J Crim L 365 at 377; Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement:
Congratulations and Cautions” (2016) 125 Yale LJ Forum 281 at 296; Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Title
IX’s Civil Rights Approach and the Criminal Justice System: Enabling Separate but Coordinated
Parallel Proceedings” in Sara Carrigan Wooten & Roland W Mitchell, eds, The Crisis of Campus
Sexual Violence: Critical Perspectives on Prevention and Response (New York: Routledge, 2016)
125 at 139-141; Alexandra Brodsky, “Against Taking Rape Seriously: The Case Against Mandatory
Referral Laws for Campus Gender Violence” (2018) 53:1 Harv CR-CLL Rev 131 at 141; Mandi Gray,
Book Review of Sexual Violence at Canadian Universities: Activism, Institutional Responses. and
Strategies for Change by Elizabeth Quinlan et al, eds, (2019) 13:1 Studies in Social Justice 196 at 199200; Kate Rossiter, Tracy Porteous & Misha Dhillon, “Critical Components of a Survivor-Centred
Response to Campus Sexual Violence” in Crocker, Minaker & Nelund, eds, supra note 81, 21 at 27.
144. See Gruber, supra note 109.
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other racialized men, low-income people, and people with mental illness
for punishment and mass incarceration.145 Positioning the carceral state as
protective rather than oppressive of men and women’s equality interests
is a function of white supremacy, settler colonialism, and heterosexism.
Feminists should actively resist these forces.
The issue of trauma raises additional considerations in this context. On
the one hand, elevating trauma as a marker of sexual harm has raised the
public’s awareness about the importance of trauma-informed lawyering
in campus sexual violence cases.146 Feelings of terror, helplessness, and
despair can affect complainants’ ability to interpret events in the past,
manage the stress of a legal process, and respond in ways that members of
the legal system expect.147 Recognizing this, feminist law and policymakers
have sought to educate legal actors on how to implement trauma-informed
approaches to professional service delivery. Considerable research has
been done on how to improve criminal reporting procedures, police-victim
interviews, and cross-examination techniques in order to better protect
complainants’ health and well-being.148 Legislative changes to facilitate
these kinds of approaches are needed. In the criminal justice system and
elsewhere, the law contributes to the therapeutic conditions in which
trauma and related emotional and psychological states are born, nurtured,
and left to worsen. As Robin West argues, “[w]e need to hold the law and
the bodies of law that produce emotional toxicity accountable, and to do
so we need to examine the multiple connections, causal, circumstantial,
intended, or not, between not only law and the emotions it consciously
seeks to regulate or suppress or honor, but also between our socially
widespread emotional ill-health and our various legal cruelties.”149
On the other hand, Lauren Berlant cautions that emotional and
specifically fearful, traumatized subjectivity has replaced rational
subjectivity as an essential index of value for personhood and thus for
society.150 Berlant’s claim is not that emotional and rational subjectivity
are psychologically distinct, but that expressing one’s “true” self as the
145. Ibid.
146. See generally Judith Daylen, Wendy Van Tongeren Harvey & Dennis O’Toole, Trauma, Trials,
and Transformation: Guiding Sexual Assault Victims through the Legal System and Beyond (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2006).
147. Ibid. See also Melanie Randall & Lori Haskell, “Trauma-Informed Approaches to Law: Why
Restorative Justice Must Understand Trauma and Psychological Coping” (2013) 36:2 Dal LJ 501;
Melanie Randall, “Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence? From Vaguely Hostile Skeptic to
Cautious Convert: Why Feminists Should Critically Engage with Restorative Approaches to Law”
(2013) 36:2 Dal LJ 461 at 491.
148. See Randall & Haskell, supra note 147; Randall, supra note 147 at 493.
149. Robin West, “Law’s Emotions” (2016) 19:4 Rich JL & Pub Int 339 at 360.
150. Berlant, supra note 79 at 111.
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subject of feeling—what Brown refers to as “compulsory discursivity”
—has emerged as a functional prerequisite for identification, recognition,
and belonging in the public sphere.151 The clearest example is the
#MeToo movement, in which a combination of social and cultural
pressure effectively compelled complainants to take up voice and produce
emotional testimony. The self-evidence and objectivity of their painful
experiences legitimized claims to increased punishments in their names.152
Such moral actions, Berlant suggests, feel like justice because they help
to eradicate complainants’ pain.153 Feeling justice comes to mean the same
thing as feeling better. Berlant never makes this point explicitly, but one
of the consequences of this regime is that it becomes challenging to talk
about the so-called “minor” injuries—the more banal and quotidian, but
no less significant harms that women and other historically marginalized
groups endure—because they are read as less painful and exceptional and
therefore less worthy of being heard.
A related concern is that certain representations of fear and trauma,
specifically white women’s stories, are more legible to the masses and
tend to invoke stronger emotional reactions in members of the public than
others.154 Feeling someone else’s pain and suffering is not necessarily
coextensive with the extent of pain and suffering that is happening on a
wider scale.155 Critics have referred to this phenomenon as “emotional
selectivity,” which suggests that our emotions may not be comprehensive
indicators of equality and justice in some cases.156 The paradigm image
of the fearful, traumatized victim elides important distinctions in the
modalities of victimization that complainants experience, while further
isolating complainants and racialized women especially who cannot or
choose not to express their emotions in a “socially acceptable” manner,
inspiring less compassion and empathy as a result. Research on rape myths
and stereotypes confirms that complainants who do not look or act like
“good victims” are less likely to be believed, have their reports taken
151. Ibid at 111-112. For Brown’s work on compulsory discursivity, see Wendy Brown, Edgework:
Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 85.
152. See Berlant, supra note 79 at 107, 111; Moran, supra note 98 at 934.
153. Berlant, supra note 152 at 108, 112.
154. Susan A Bandes, “Moral Imagination in Judging” (2011) 51:1 Washburn LJ 1: Illustrating this,
Susan Bandes observes that “[j]udges may be skilled at empathetic understanding, or they may exercise
empathy selectively toward certain groups, though those groups are more likely to be powerful than
disenfranchised” (ibid at 9). See also Ahmed, Cultural Politics, supra note 34 at 191-192.
155. See Buhler, supra note 48 at 413. Emily Kidd White makes the related point that a claimant’s
subjective experience of a rights violation may or may not correspond with a rights violation at formal
law. See Kidd White, supra note 35 at 114.
156. See Megan Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999) at
185-186.

32 The Dalhousie Law Journal

seriously, and receive the community services they need to recover.157 This
“feeling gap” in legal and political apprehension, as one might call it, is a
serious problem.
To bridge this gap, feminist law and policymakers should centre the
lived experiences of racialized, Indigenous, and bisexual women, and trans
people in campus sexual violence law and policy because they represent the
most likely targets of campus sexual violence.158 Centering the experiences
of these groups should lead feminists and other stakeholders to become more
emotionally invested in their welfare. Fostering compassion, empathy, and
other pro-social emotions toward intersectional communities is relevant to
enabling one’s capacity for “multi-perspectival” legal imagination—the
practice of imagining the “needs, interests and values of another person
as they are refracted in the concrete and particular experiences of persons
in their relations with the world and others.”159 Considering a variety of
such perspectives is likely to improve feminist law and policymaking
by constructing a more complete picture of the relationships at issue in a
given case, and thereby expand the possibilities for creating relations for
the future that are marked by care, concern, and respect for other people,
consistent with the principle of substantive equality.160 Challenging the
law’s violence requires us to recognize that our fates are interconnected
and everyone’s lives, without exception, are both the subjects of feeling
and proper objects of feminist attention.
Conclusion
In this article, I explained how emotional incitements in the Dalhousie
Dentistry case contributed to a legal and political infrastructure
that supported carceral state responses to campus sexual violence.
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79 at 94; Hirsch & Khan, supra note 95 at 244.
159. See Del Mar, supra note 28 at 150. For more on the importance of fostering compassion in law,
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First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method” (1989) 11:1 Women’s Rts L Rep
7; Bandes, supra note 154 at 24.
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Correspondingly, I explained why the restorative justice process in the
case was framed by some commentators as a form of “weak justice,”
insufficiently “tough on crime,” and therefore outside the bounds of
feminist action. My central claim is not that particular emotional reactions
to campus sexual violence are right or wrong—emotions just are—but
that feminist law and policymakers should reflect on the consequences of
their moral actions taken in response. Feeling like something is effective at
addressing campus sexual violence does not necessarily make it so.
I have focused on crime logic as one emotional politics that contradicts
feminist goals, but there are many others that researchers should examine
and criticize as well, providing the basis for future work. I am particularly
struck by the fearful rhetoric and strategic, conservative outrage of transexclusionary radical feminists that is focused on oppressing trans women
and gender non-conforming people through the passage of “bathroom
bills” and other restrictive interpretations of human rights laws, both in
Canada and elsewhere.161 One could similarly focus on the feelings of
shame, disgust, and antipathy that prohibitionist women’s groups have
mobilized toward sex workers in the process of advocating for the Nordic
model of prostitution law reform.162 In each of these contexts, emotional
investments being made in and through feminist law and policymaking
have the effect of regulating gender and sexuality without challenging the
power structures of transphobia and heteronormativity that bear down on
historically marginalized groups in harmful ways. If emotions are central
to the process of feminist mobilization, then it should be incumbent on
feminists to consider the force of our emotions from a substantive equality
perspective. Moral actions are not all morally and politically equal.
Critically reflecting on the progress of campus sexual violence reform
helps us to see that.
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